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Policy > General
> Drug use and Civil Rights
Note:
This
briefing considers the civil rights questions raised by drug prohibition,
arguing for a new alternative legal framework. The Author is Roger Warren
Evans, a member of the civil rights organisation Liberty. This is an edited
version (Transform) of a paper submitted to Liberty by Evans arguing for
Liberty to call for the end of Prohibition (for the unedited text contact
TDPF). At the Liberty 2000 AGM the following motion was passed:
"This
AGM upholds the right of access of every adult to the lawful supply of
psychoactive substances for personal consumption save where expressly
constrained by or under the law for the purpose of protecting minors,
countering crime, treating addiction, or some other legitimate public
purpose and calls on the government to reform the laws accordingly"
(25.6.00)
Introduction
Over the
next decade, each nation will reach its own accommodation between
prohibition and personal freedom, between the liberal and the authoritarian
ethos. Seat belts and crash helmets may raise the same issues of principle,
but they have far less resonance. It is the private, personal consumption
of 'drugs' which triggers the key debate which is now upon us.
Humans have
always been attracted by substances, which affect subjective states of
mind. Beer, wine, distilled spirits, tobacco, coca, caffeine, cannabis,
heroin, laudanum, opiates and hallucinogens - they are all in regular
use the world over. The phenomenon is so widespread that it seems universal.
Whilst drugs
bring widespread personal pleasure to millions, some have been shown to
have an adverse mental or physical effect, some to cause lasting harm,
and they all have differing addictive propensities. But the mere possibility
of harmful personal consequences is not, and cannot be, sufficient to
justify intervention by the state. By what right does any Government,
in a free society, presume to interfere with this process? The deployment
of coercive intervention should be challenged, from the outset, as a matter
of first principle.
"Our
thoughts are free", said Goethe. The individuals own state of mind
is the ultimate zone of freedom, where no Government should enter in.
By contrast, totalitarian regimes have been marked by a refusal to accept
the ultimate freedom of the mind, the ultimate sovereignty of the individual.
Political and spiritual intolerance and persecution follow.
It is wholly
acceptable for the state to regulate the modalities of "lawful supply".
But where the consumption of a psychoactive substance represents a private
act, reflecting a private decision, with only individual consequences,
there can be no foundation for any state preventive intervention at all,
in its consumption, its procurement or its supply.
Five
Qualifying Principles
There are clearly circumstances in which societal intervention is justified,
and not to be seen as a wrongful abridgement of individual liberty. Indeed,
there are five sectors in which state intervention is entirely appropriate,
not by way of exception to this liberal principle, but by way of its specific
application.
(1) The
Maturation of the Young
The freedom itself adheres to the mature adult. There is a widespread
consensus that the deployment of state resources is fully justified, both
by way of positive education and supply constraints, to inhibit the consumption
of psychoactive substances by the young.
(2) Contract
enforcement
Where an individual has actually agreed not to make use of a psychoactive
substance, or any such substances, state intervention is ordinarily justified
to enforce that contractual commitment. In some sectors of employment,
such constraints are demonstrably expedient: public vehicle drivers, of
aeroplanes, trains, coaches, taxis, and other such safety critical positions
all accept such constraints, and it is in the public interest that they
should be held to their promises. The litmus test is the competence of
individuals to perform required tasks, and contractual constraints should
not go beyond that.
(3) Criminal
law enforcement
The accommodation of psychoactive substances has long been a feature of
criminal justice. For example, it is settled law that intoxication cannot
be used as a defence, where other breaches of the law are alleged. It
must also be evident that the administration of psychoactive substances
without consent is and should remain a serious trespass to the person.
Finally, difficult judgements have to be made where the consumption of
psychoactive substances coincides with the presence of any underlying
mental condition. These examples, properly understood, all affirm the
principle of individual freedom, and reflect its proper reconciliation
with other legitimate societal interests.
(4) Constraint
upon social interaction
There are examples of circumstances where drug consumption may properly
be constrained by law, e.g. where the consumption is in public or otherwise
obtrusive to others, or where (even if in private) the consumption forms
part of a wider pattern of collective behaviour with adverse consequences.
It is for each society, in each age, to define the principles of intervention
where others, who may be considered "at risk", are involved.
The principle is difficult to apply, and several applications have been
contentious (e.g. in the "passive smoking" debate, and in the
decision of the Courts in the Spanner Case, where private consensual sado-masochistic
practices were held to be unlawful). Nevertheless, although particular
examples may be controversial, the principle of legitimate state intervention
is not refuted.
(5) Public
health
There are clearly circumstances where overriding considerations of public
health justify state intervention and the abridgement of individual rights.
These are well developed and widely understood: it is right that society
should at all times ensure that risks to consumers of substantial harm
should be avoided. By upholding the primacy of personal freedom, Liberty
would not be seeking to reduce or constrain the effectiveness of these
powers.
These five
propositions are simply stressing that the right-to-consume adheres to
adults only, and may be overridden in the pursuit of other legitimate
societal interests, where drug consumption is shown to put others at risk
of harm. These constraints leave unabridged the freedom of individual
adult consumption, whatever the features of the psychoactive substance,
in the absence of any demonstrable harm to others.
Five fallacious
arguments
Throughout
this debate, there are five types of argument which are fallacious, and
which generate unending confusion:
(1) The
wrongful attribution of cause
It is said that the prohibition of drugs is justified because of the growing
scale of drug-related crime. It must be evident, however, that the true
explanation for this explosion lies not with "drug" consumption
itself, but with the very processes of prohibition which seek to contain
it. In terms of societal consequences, the harm done by the "war
on drugs" is immeasurably greater than any of the originating harms
of consumption. Because of prohibition, illegal market prices and profits
remain high, and poorer consumers are forced into crime to finance their
consumption. Because of prohibition, criminal networks have been given
an ideal point-of-entry into mainstream society, suborning legitimate
institutions. Our very paradigm of criminal justice is unsettled by the
need to gather proof of "victim-less" crimes, where those who
are said to have been harmed are enthusiastic participants in the process.
Intrusive surveillance, stings, entrapment - these Police practices are
the common coin of drugs-law enforcement, threatening the privacy of millions,
above and beyond those involved.
(2) The
wrongful cumulation of individual action
Of all the fallacies that bedevil this debate, this is the simplest and
the most deceptive. "One person doing drugs may be OK, but what if
everyone does it? Surely that would undermine social order as we know
it?" The cumulative effect of individual actions can, of course,
become unacceptably disruptive. As a matter of civil rights, Liberty should
assert that there are no circumstances in which the exercise by an individual
of a civil right can become wrongful merely by its cumulation with the
acts of other individuals.
(3) The
wrongful exaggeration of risk
Proponents of prohibition and the use of the criminal law to penalise
"drug" consumption commonly justify their arguments by the magnitude
of the risk to life-and-health, which are run by their consumers. Yet
all available statistical analysis places the risk of significant injury
or death very low indeed. Even the risks of tobacco and alcohol, amongst
the most dangerous of all psychoactive substances, compare favourably
with the risks run (for example) by sports people and road-users. Liberty
should have no truck with these forms of statistical manipulation, and
should seek to dispel these fallacious contentions.
(4) The
wrongful NHS constraint
It is commonly argued that prohibition is justified, because drug consumption
can have harmful medical consequences, and therefore costs for the NHS.
Certain NHS doctors are known to refuse treatment to heavy smokers, in
reliance upon the same reasoning. That proposition is simply misconceived.
No legal constraint can be justified on that ground. If that reasoning
were sound, the introduction into any society of compulsory health insurance
would mean the end of all personal risk-taking, the elimination of a wide
swathe of individual freedoms.
(5) The
wrongful prohibition of trading
One influential intermediate "position" is that, while individual
adult consumption of drugs should be free of formal constraint, all other
aspects of the possession, storage, supply, distribution and trading in
the substance should be illegal. Such muddled thinking is unacceptable,
as a matter of liberal principle. If adult personal consumption is lawful,
then the corresponding trade must also be lawful. Where drug trading affects
minors, legal counter-measures will be justified: that is not in contention.
Nor in contention is the right of each society to impose regulation upon
that lawful supply of drugs: one option is a state monopoly, and other
forms of registration, regulation and licensing are easily imaginable,
as with tobacco and alcohol.
Conclusion
We should
take up a very simple position that the adult voluntary use of any psychoactive
substance is a matter of unbridgeable personal freedom. As with all legal
principles, there are exceptions. But it is for those who assert the exceptions
to demonstrate the case for such action. The burden of proof should lie,
not with those who uphold individual freedom, but upon the shoulders of
those who contend for its qualification.
The "drugs
laws" of the UK are illegitimate in principle and objectionable in
practice. They should be repealed and replaced by a new liberal civic
order, based on respect for the individual and upon the simple assertion
of personal freedom. Where the adult consumption of a psychoactive substance
represents a private act, reflecting a personal decision with only individual
consequences, there can be no foundation for any state intervention at
all, by way of either criminal or civil law. All taint of criminality
should be removed, as with alcohol and tobacco.
Roger Warren
Evans is a qualified barrister, company director and charity trustee.
He is a senior fellow and Trustee of the Institute of Community Studies
and was a leading national officer of Equal Rights, the 1960's campaign
for race equality legislation. He has served as a London Borough Councillor
and is now Community Councillor in Swansea.
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